by Bernard Brunet, Former Head of Unit, DG European Neighbourhood and
Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR), European Commission, Brussels
The brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent realisation among EU leaders that President Putin envisions a restored Imperial Russia has produced the greatest security crisis on the European continent since the Cold War. This new geopolitical landscape has emerged as the prominent factor in the European Council’s decision to accelerate EU enlargement, including a clear EU membership perspective for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia and a faster accession process for the six Western Balkan countries.
Easy solutions do not exist
Despite the EU’s commitment, at the highest level, it is evident that the next enlargement will not be an easy nor a rapid process. The European Council made it clear that enlargement remains a merit-based approach and that it will continue to be based on the existing accession criteria. While the Commission’s October 2024 enlargement package gave the clearest indications so far that accession negotiations could be finalised with Montenegro and Albania before the end of the decade, it highlighted numerous problematic issues for which easy solutions do not exist.
Within the EU, there are concerns that a swift accession of new Member States could lead to significant challenges. There’s apprehension that the competitiveness of exports from the potential new members would disrupt the single market, while their citizens seek better economic opportunities and employment in the richer EU Member States. Furthermore, unresolved bilateral issues between candidate countries and EU Member States (e.g. Bulgaria/North Macedonia) further complicate the enlargement process.
The next EU enlargement will also be more complicated due to external factors. Russia will continue to act as a spoiler, backing anti-EU parties within existing Member States and candidate countries. Russian interference is already evident and growing in many countries, notably in Serbia, as well as in Moldova, as evidenced by the open efforts to influence the recent presidential elections and the referendum on EU membership. Russia will do its utmost to drag candidate countries away from their EU paths.
Preparing for the next enlargement
To make the next enlargement a success, the EU must step up its support of the security and prosperity of candidates, while the authorities in candidate countries need to increase their commitment to, and implementation of, EU-related reforms.
Unlocking a process of rapid and sustained real income convergence will bridge the poverty gap and ease the necessary investments in security. This process will require more than strong macroeconomic fundamentals: candidate countries must accelerate domestic reforms across the board. Moreover, the EU must bolster the credibility of the enlargement process to ensure that economic operators anticipate the benefits of accessing the EU single market. This would trigger much-needed inflows of foreign direct investment and thus accelerate modernisation.
In this context, the EU has mobilised additional resources for the Western Balkans (€6bn), Moldova (€1bn) and Ukraine (€50bn) for the period until 2027. These additional resources will support much needed economic and social reforms and investments in the key areas linked to EU accession. Sustained reforms by the candidates in the areas of the rule of law, an independent judiciary, fundamental rights, and the improvement of the quality of institutions will be necessary complements to economic reforms and investments. Achieving this will require a “whole of society” reform agenda, with a particular focus on advancing reforms related to EU accession in those areas.
Focus on policies, not on EU
institutional reforms
To ensure the credibility of the enlargement process, the EU must also prepare itself for an expanded Union. The main objective of such changes should be to adjust and design EU policies that ensure greater security and strategic autonomy on the continent as soon as possible.
This should take precedence over the debate on institutional reform of the EU, which could turn into a distraction given the high stakes at play. Recent years have demonstrated that existing institutional structures and rules did not prevent effective EU actions, from the Commission issuing bonds on capital markets to the common purchasing of millions of vaccines and the procurement of lethal arms in support of Ukraine.
A starting point in the policy reflection is to focus on strengthening unity in the face of what looks like a new, multi-year confrontation with Russia on the European continent. This will require the design, or redesign, of policies that ensure solidarity and unity, with all EU Member States recognising that their security is tied to the collective security of the European continent and is a shared responsibility well worth the investment. The second factor to consider in redesigning EU policies for the future is to acknowledge that there will be a constellation of more diverse national interests in an enlarged EU and that this may require a greater mix of action at the national and EU levels to reach common objectives.
Setting the right priorities
for foreign and security policy
With political expressions of populism and nationalism remaining strong in many EU countries, policymakers should be ready to focus on a reduced number of priorities, specifically security and defence, the single market, strategic autonomy, and the green deal. This will require additional resources at the EU level.
In the security and defence area, the EU should focus on building the EU industrial basis and stepping up efforts to reduce duplications and build common armament platforms. The presentation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy, including the launch of the European Defence Investment Programme, is a positive start. However, Member States must substantially scale up their resources earmarked for the fund. Also, more effort is needed towards joint procurement and the establishment of common export control rules of armaments, the lack of which currently hampers common projects.
Building closer relations with the UK, Switzerland, and Norway is essential. Regardless of their status, all three countries have a stake in the security, stability, and strategic autonomy of the European continent. The EU must therefore strengthen ties with the UK in the defence sector, including through cooperation with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and in the context of the new European Defence Industrial Plan. Regarding Norway and Switzerland, particular attention must be given to energy security, protection of critical infrastructure, access to critical materials, and the development of common projects for enhancing strategic autonomy.
