Interview with Denis Verret, former Senior Vice-President of EADS (now Airbus) and member of the Council of EuroDéfense-France, Paris, and Colonel (ret.) Ralph Thiele, Managing Director StratByrd Consulting and President of EuroDéfense-Germany, Berlin
The European: Gentlemen, in November 2023 you published a joint article in the French newspaper La Tribune in which you wrote that Franco-German defence cooperation is a “must” and that it should be open to other EU Member States. You called the European ambition for strategic autonomy a necessary contribution to global security. What exactly does strategic autonomy mean?
Denis Verret: It means that Europe must express its own views and protect its own interests in the world without naivety and over-dependence. This ambition has been formally expressed in the EU’s Strategic Compass, adopted unanimously in March 2022, following the Versailles Declaration a few days earlier: “A stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence of its members.” This was already stated by US President Biden and French President Macron in a joint declaration in March 2021.
Ralph Thiele: The EU has so far lacked significant ambitions and capabilities commensurate with its interests and responsibilities in Europe and beyond. Vis-à-vis increasingly unstable and threatening geopolitical developments, strategic autonomy is urgently needed to strengthen the EU’s role as a security provider, capable of addressing regional and global security challenges alone or with partners such as NATO.
The European: What does this imply?
R. Thiele: The EU must possess its own powerful capabilities to design, plan and conduct politico-military missions from the tactical to the strategic in order to influence opponents’ decision-making. This implies a particular focus on strengthening Europe’s Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB) to reduce dependence on non-European suppliers, especially in critical areas such as advanced technologies.
The European: Let’s come back to the Franco-German defence cooperation that you called a ”must”. Isn’t this cooperation continuously overshadowed by a kind of mistrust, particularly in the sensitive field of armaments cooperation?
R. Thiele: From the point of view of industrial interests, each side is indeed suspicious that the other wants more for itself and less for the partner and is trying to take undue advantage of the partnership.
The European: But what is the prerequisite for fruitful cooperation in such a sensitive sector like armaments?
D. Verret: First of all, high-level political agreements, well prepared with industry, and the observance of full equality between the French and German industrial partners in terms of volume and technological value.
The European: Is this the case for the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS)?
D. Verret: Yes, decisions on air and ground systems of the future were taken at the highest political level and with the full support of the Chiefs of Defence (CHODS) of both our countries.
R. Thiele: However, political and technological obstacles continue to surface, which is quite normal in such ambitious projects, and it is also normal that they give rise to debate.
D. Verret: But when these become public, the press focuses more on disagreements than agreements. In my opinion, bashing has become systematic!
The European: Is this a question of communication?
D. Verret: Indeed, Berlin and Paris need to do a better job of communicating successful steps in cooperation through the media and social networks.
R. Thiele: I agree, proper communication through the media and social networks is important because if only negative comments and bashing dominate public debate, it will be harder to achieve a positive outcome for our respective efforts.
The European: So, you are pleading for a more closely aligned defence and security strategy?
R. Thiele: Yes, and we need more comprehensive, concrete joint proposals to meet common operational requirements, ensure real military operational capability and master the critical technologies of today and tomorrow.
D. Verret: We are both convinced that we need a joint white paper on security and defence, in which we commit ourselves to advances in governmental and industrial cooperation to match common and respective priorities. Cooperation is a prerequisite for critical mass!
The European: And what about exports? Is that not another prerequisite?
R. Thiele: Export control policy is an attribute of national sovereignty, within the framework of relevant common templates such as the Common Position, regularly updated by the European Council. To develop joint programmes, we need our policies to converge, because critical mass can only be achieved by both cooperation and exports.
D. Verret: That’s why, after decades of positive experience with the bilateral Schmidt-Debré agreement, our two nations signed a new agreement in November 2019. It is more comprehensive, covering not only cooperative governmental programmes but also industrial cooperation and “de minimis” rules for streamlining cross-border supply chains. The excellent news is that this agreement has been extended to Spain in 2022 and that the UK, the Netherlands and Italy are now expressing their interest in joining too.
R. Thiele: Let me add that programmes must promote consolidation and be followed by integration through Centres of Excellence (CoE) fairly distributed among the parties. In terms of communication, there must be a greater room for agreements reached by simple consensus or joint performance!
The European: Can you name positive or negative examples?
D. Verret: A recent success is the Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) in Canada, which proves that the European solution is the best in class, basically due to the consolidation in military transport aircraft, but this is also true of helicopters, satellites or tactical missiles.
R. Thiele: We both insist that even an agreement which has been difficult to arrive at must not be concealed. Hiding away the results of a common understanding can only weaken it.
The European: Is this also true for “no goes” such as the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), where Berlin seems to have forgotten to invite France to join?
R. Thiele: Indeed, Paris is not in the programme – yet. And of course, there should have been better communication with Paris.
D. Verret: Let me add that it is essential to review this project in order to bring it into line with NATO planning, to take fuller account of the diversity of threats and possible operational and interoperable defensive and offensive responses and to unlock long-term European alternatives to German, American and Israeli solutions.
R. Thiele: And, to conclude on the communication dimension of Franco-German relations, if there is an apparent deadlock on a particular issue, then we need to be honest about it, make it public and show that we are determined to do everything possible to overcome it.
The European: By systematic dialogue, person to person, at each level? And if that is not enough?
D. Verret: We are both suggesting to our respective governments that they consider appointing a German and a French “ombudsman for defence industrial cooperation”, somebody from civil society, whose task would be to monitor the development of bilateral defence relations and alert the highest authorities in case of serious difficulties.
The European: Gentlemen, I thank you and wish you every success in your future endeavours.