by Hartmut Bühl, Paris
It is time to face up to the fact that arrangements that have governed European security and defence policy for decades – with the US as the “security provider” guaranteeing nuclear protection and the Europeans as “security consumers” – no longer work.
The reflex of standing up to the Americans is no longer fashionable in the current, more complex, geopolitical situation and at a time when a former US president, who could be re-elected, invites the Russian dictator to prey on those NATO member countries that are not spending enough on their defence.
Consequently, the Union must adopt a policy of realpolitik based on the current state of geopolitics and geostrategy. However, this is easier said than done.
A Europe of defence – what configuration?
What could a Europe of defence, with greater responsibilities and a better organisation of its military resources, as stipulated in the 2022 Strategic Compass, look like? Would it be a Union in its current configuration where each Member State has its say on security and defence? Or a Union organised as a federal state, with a constitution, a presidency, a council of ministers, common legislation and last but not least, a military commander-in-chief?
No chance that this latter option will see the light of day soon, which also rules out the utopia of an integrated European army.
Between dreams…
Those who advocate for such an integrated army and argue that it will solve the problems of duplication and dependence on the US and NATO, may not see all the practical difficulties behind this appealing concept.
Firstly, such a European army under the Union’s command and control would need a military and civil organisation at EU level as well as in each of the 27 Member States. It would also mean a European budget with cost sharing under European control, harmonised jurisdictions and common principles of leadership.
Secondly, as regards armament and equipment, it would be necessary to embark on a long process of unified planning for weapons and equipment, training and exercises so as to achieve interoperability. That would at least be feasible, but only in a long-term perspective.
Thirdly, it would be the necessary to find solutions to employment issues including staff careers, salaries, pensions and of course the problems of religions, traditions, participation etc. Everyone who has been involved in a leading position or commanded a multinational unit knows that this is a daunting challenge!
Fourthly, each politico-military decision taken at EU or national level concerning international organisations such as the UN, OSCE, etc. would have to be approved by both the EU and each member state.
Do we really have the will and the time to create such an army?
…and pragmatic solutions
Let’s have a brief look back at ambitious multinational forces projects. The Treaty on the Franco-German army corps (later the Eurocorps) was signed in La Rochelle on 21 May 1992 after four months of intense and emotional negotiations. The agreement was struck in a spirit of compromise by combining different command and work cultures and became the model for all the subsequent multinational units in Europe, such as the German-Dutch corps, the Baltic corps with Germany, Denmark and Poland, the Portuguese-Spanish-Italian division, EUROFOR, to mention only the land forces. At a later stage, non-standing naval (e.g. EUROMARFOR) and air units (e.g. the European Air Group, EAG) were launched.
The first important lesson from the experience of Eurocorps was not to mix units from different nations at too low a level, to respect culture and tradition, understand and respect disciplinary systems and encourage the troops to socialise in training seminars.
To me therefore it seems wiser, rather than dreaming of an integrated European army, to strive for a fully-fledged European defence alliance with multinational units in different configurations. There would be civil-military headquarters at EU level and operational headquarters commanding all types of members states’ forces and existing multinational units on land, sea and in the air.
A nuclear force for Europe?
With the effective start of Brexit on 31 January 2020, France is now the only EU member state that has nuclear capabilities and is a member of the UN Security Council. Against the background of the current tense geopolitical situation, the nuclear threat from Russia and the uncertainty regarding American nuclear protection in the future, there are discussions about whether the Union needs to own and be able to operate nuclear weapons or whether France is able to guarantee the protection of the Union with its powerful and deliberately limited national deterrence capabilities. This issue needs clarification.
De Gaulle’s doctrine is still valid
First of all, it is important to note that French President Emanuel Macron remains faithful to General de Gaulle’s doctrine of nuclear “non-participation”. Macron clearly stated on 7 February 2020 at the Ecole Militaire in Paris that French nuclear weapons cannot be shared. They are not battlefield weapons and only have one purpose: to deter in order to avert war. The credibility of the French nuclear strategy depends on the unacceptable nature of the damage that a possible aggressor would suffer. However, during the same speech, Macron spoke in favour of a strong and autonomous defence of Europe, in which “France must take its responsibilities and play its role”. French vital interests now have a “European dimension” Macron said, and he invited his European partners “to participate in an in-depth strategic dialogue and joint exercises on deterrence”, with a view to greater strategic autonomy for Europe.
Since then, Russia has attacked Ukraine, threatened Europe with its nuclear weapons and Europeans have woken up to the uncomfortable reality that US nuclear protection can no longer be taken for granted.
Let’s stay rational
Against the background of current geopolitical realities, nuclear protection as a condition “sine qua non” for Europe’s security will continue to be the main issue for discussion. However, nuclear forces under the control of the EU will remain a flight of fancy, similar to the “European army”. As regards French nuclear armaments, an official and written extension would even reduce the credibility of French deterrence. For me there can be no question that the decision to use nuclear weapons will remain French. And I would add that the Union will not imitate NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), a sort of college which discusses a nuclear response, especially first use, and takes decisions unanimously.
So, let’s stay rational. Despite bad omens, the American nuclear umbrella is still valid and French deterrence is a complement to it, as it always was. It is only if the US were to leave NATO that the situation would really change!
Conclusion
In view of the current geopolitical and geostrategic situation, Europe must conduct a realpolitik and stop dreaming of a European army. Instead, it must devote its energy to a policy of building up the necessary military capabilities to defend its territory and that of its allies as well as producing state-of-the-art armaments by pooling its Member States’ capabilities. In the field of nuclear protection, although Macron has proposed a strategic dialogue on the subject, there has never been any question of “pooling” the French nuclear deterrent.
However, I am convinced that the nuclear capacity of France, as a Member of the Union, is, in itself, dissuasive and protects the Union by its simple existence – which is a sort of tacit extension! ■
The author has been publishing articles on the French nuclear strategy since 1974. In 1992 he led German’s team in negotiations with France on the build-up of the future multinational Eurocorps and subsequently was the German official responsible for opening the headquarters in Strasbourg before becoming Deputy Chief of Staff Operations (DCOS) of Eurocorps (1994-1996).