by Marcus D. King, Professor of the Practice in Environment and International Affairs, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
Water stress is a growing problem in many parts of the world. Approximately two billion people worldwide lack access to safe drinking water, and nearly half of the world’s population experiences severe water scarcity for at least one month each year. These numbers are expected to increase as the growing impacts of climate change, including drought and desertification, and severe weather events lower the quantity and quality of water supplies worldwide. The Middle East and regions of Africa such as North Africa and the Sahel are two areas where these impacts are pervasive.
Water becomes a political issue
As water becomes scarcer, it becomes subject to manipulation for political ends by national governments and sub-state actors. For example, states with relatively greater water resources are increasingly able to wield power and exercise strategic advantage over their neighbors. This domination (hydro-hegemony) can include one country unilaterally constructing water infrastructure, usually dams, that in turn restrict the flow of water to downstream countries.
This is the case with Ethiopia’s ongoing construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which impounds water on the upper reaches of the Nile River. As a result, Egypt, which lies downstream and is dependent on the river for about 90% of its water, will lose a substantial portion of its supply. Beset by climate change-induced heatwaves and desertification, Egypt has become increasingly frustrated as talks over water allocation between the nations have stalled. Meanwhile in September 2023, Ethiopia hit a huge milestone as the water reservoir behind the dam finally reached its capacity, increasing the country’s ability to generate electricity while also restricting water flow to Egypt.
Water stress profits extreme organizations
In my research on environmental security and conflict, I noticed that areas under the influence of violent extremist organizations (VEOs), such as the so-called Islamic State, often experienced climate change-driven water stress. This correlation caused me to ask deeper questions about the nature of water’s relation to conflict in VEO-controlled areas across a wide spectrum of pre- and post-conflict situations.
I found that within these nations especially, a water-stress and conflict cycle culminated in the weaponization of water. Water stressors such as increasing temperatures, drought, desertification and poor water governance policies manifest in systemic outcomes which include diminished agricultural yields and reduced food security. This, in turn, led to human responses such as migration within the country and across borders, involvement in extremist organizations and a rise in various forms of violence.
My research explores how VEOs have increased their ability to dominate their enemies both on and off the battlefield by manipulating water. It takes a deep dive into conflict dynamics in three distinct geographies: Syria and Iraq, Nigeria and Somalia – all places that experienced droughts between 2012 and 2017.
I found that the outcomes of the water and conflict cycle enabled VEOs to use water as a weapon in a variety of destabilizing ways. I define a weapon as a medium, action or offensive capability used to coerce, injure or kill. According to this definition, I categorized dozens of actions by VEOs into six types of water weaponization strategic, tactical, coercive, unintentional, psychological and extortive or incentive.
VEOs have used water as a weapon in ways that fall into each of the categories mentioned. For example, in 2014, strategic water weaponization in Iraq was widely covered in the international media. The Islamic State seized and briefly controlled the Mosul Dam on the Tigris River, about 140 kilometers upstream from the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad. This action provided the Islamic State with virtual control of a vast area in the shadow of the dam and the ability to destroy the dam and unleash a torrent of water capable of flooding the “Green Zone” – or the location where allied forces led by the U.S. were based. As a result, the U.S. was drawn deeper into the conflict, initiating an airpower campaign in an attempt to dislodge the terrorists from their position.
Sadly, there is ample evidence to suggest that the practice of water weaponization is spreading beyond the incidents I discovered in my research. Other violent extremists are weaponizing water in the Middle East and Africa, ranging from armed conflict in Burkina Faso to the Civil War in Yemen. The war in Ukraine has also featured numerous instances of water contamination, ecological destruction and targeting of water infrastructure. These events culminated in the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in 2023, almost certainly the work of Putin’s saboteurs, providing an advantage to Russia on the battlefield.
Climate change – time is not on our side
It is clearly in the global interest to stop the proliferation of water weaponization for a host of legal, ethical and practical reasons. However, a rapidly changing climate is a critical factor in the international community’s response to the odious practice of water weaponization – and a key reason why time is not on our side.
A litany of higher temperatures, precipitation changes, extreme weather events and glacier depletions are steadily expanding the global footprint of water stress. As this happens, the potential locations where water can be weaponized by nations and VEOs grow in tandem.
My research suggests that promoting climate adaptation in vulnerable countries is part of the answer. Better adaptation measures such as more efficient irrigation techniques and the use of drought-resistant seed varieties can address the underlying conditions that create the water and conflict cycle and enable water weaponization.
Internationally, under climate change agreements, the principle of “Loss and Damage” obligates countries that are relatively heavy greenhouse gas emitters to provide funds to enable climate change adaptation projects in countries with historically low emissions. Parties reached a historic agreement on the operationalization of the Loss and Damage fund and allocation priorities during the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP 28, held in Dubai in December 2023. Nonetheless, funding for Loss and Damage should be increased and its scope should be expanded to incorporate more projects that promote water accessibility and build resilience to climate change-driven water stress in vulnerable and war-torn countries. Perhaps then we will have taken a positive step against normalization of this odious form of warfare.
