by Gesine Weber, Research fellow, German Marshall Fund of the US, Paris.
With the election of Donald J. Trump as 47th president of the United States, Europeans must brace for a period of uncertainty. They have long been aware that their security hinges to a significant degree on voter preferences in US swing states, and that the American strategic priorities have shifted to the Indo-Pacific since the first Obama administration. However, it was perhaps Trump’s comments in early 2024, when he openly questioned the willingness of the United States to defend European allies in case of an attack, that made them realise that a future where Europeans will have to defend their security with less, or even without, US participation is relatively likely, if not imminent.
The most pressing security challenge is the situation in Ukraine. It is almost certain that Europeans will have to provide the lion’s share of military and economic support going forwards, but highly uncertain how the situation could evolve once Trump takes office. As the promise to quickly end the war in Ukraine was one of the key messages of his electoral campaign, a scenario where Trump strikes a deal with Putin without taking European or Ukrainian interests into consideration cannot be excluded.
Under the new US administration, Europeans will have to shoulder much more of the burden within the alliance. The lack of defence spending of most Europeans was always a point of criticism during Trump’s first presidency, but in contrast to other US presidents, Trump might condition the protection of European allies in case of an armed attack on their level of defence spending. Within Republican circles, the scenario of a “dormant NATO”, where Europeans are mostly responsible for European security and the United States only serves as a “backstop”, provided Europeans have sufficiently stepped up in terms of capabilities, has gained traction over the last year. Significant defence investment is therefore perhaps the best strategy to generate goodwill in the White House.
Beyond European security and defence, Europeans will have to brace for more coercion from Washington. As Trump has announced to impose blanket tariffs of 20% on all goods imported to the United States, including from Europe, the new administration might use this option as leverage to convince Europeans to increase their own imports from the United States, including Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), as already suggested by EU leaders recently. If the incoming US administration decides to pursue an approach of competition or even confrontation with Beijing, it is likely that the United States will demand alignment from Europeans – and to condition either transatlantic economic ties or the US security guarantee for Europe on their
compliance.
A critical challenge for Europeans in all this is maintaining European unity. During his first presidency, Trump had a tendency to focus on bilateral relationships rather than seeing the EU as a primary interlocutor. While the EU’s main challenge will be to remain relevant, European capitals will have to double down on coordination and coherent messaging towards Washington. The success of this endeavour will, however, depend on the potential individual hedging strategies of European states to generate goodwill in the White House, even if that means abandoning a common European approach.
Regardless of the strategic choices of the Trump administration, Europeans must expect to do much more in the fields of defence, economic and tech policy, and more generally as actors on global challenges. The best forum to coordinate on these challenges is the EU – and whether one likes the term or not, there is a good case to be made for European strategic autonomy, meaning the definition of European strategies based on European interests. Even if a Democrat takes over in the White House in 2028, this approach can only benefit Europe and transatlantic relations.
