by Jacques Favin Lévêque, General ret., Versailles
Despite nearly three decades of a slow and timid rise in power, the reality of European defence is modest and the result does not live up to the ambition of a major geopolitical player, which the European Union (EU) claims to be, but always with its inescapable dependence on the United States in matters of security. However, the situation is not hopeless.
Two ways to get out of dependencies
The first track consists in following with interest, but above all with patience and realism, the initiative now launched by the European Parliament to revise the treaties on which the political and legal reality of the EU is based. In particular, this could lead to the abolition of the European Council’s veto in decision-making and an increase in the competence of the Union in matters of defence. This would improve efficiency and speed of intervention.
The second track consists in starting from the current institutions of the EU and the possibilities they offer in terms of defence. In fact, firstly, we could deepen the conditions for the implementation of article 42-7 of the Treaty on European Union when a Member State feels the need to use it to deal with a threat of military nature. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) could specify the modalities of the intervention of the Member States within the framework of article 42-7.
This would also be an opportunity to address the difficult question of caveats. Indeed, each of the Member States that agrees to commit forces to an EU defence operation specifies the conditions under which its men and women can be called upon. These caveats should be the subject, if not of a pure and simple abolition, at least of the adoption of a level of risk accepted by mutual agreement. For a large number of countries, this question arises from political positions in which national parliaments play a restrictive role. The French model, which gives its president the right to engage the armed forces without consulting parliament, is in fact the exception, and many within the Union have much less freedom of action in the use of armed force.
Options for pushing European capacities
As soon as the EU decides to carry out a military operation under its responsibility, it would be appropriate to simplify and accelerate the force generation process at the level of the EU military headquarters. Rather than composing the intervention force by successive iterations, it would be faster to take as a starting point the Rapid Action Force of 5,000 men and women, provided for by the Strategic Compass, even if it means adapting it to the specific needs of the operation.
Harmonisation of operational demands
The schedule for equipping the forces is largely the responsibility of the European Defence Agency (EDA) under the responsibility of the ministers of defence, but it involves coordination with the EUMS as well as with the national armament directors and the national parliaments. The definition of joint armament programmes and the timetables for their entry into service stem from an analysis of the threats that the EUMS should undertake, in particular on the basis of the Strategic Compass. The modes of acquisition of these weapon systems could be simplified, drawing inspiration, for example, from the group purchasing procedure, tested during the Ukrainian conflict. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) opens up prospects for carrying out joint programmes or simplifying procedures that have not been sufficiently exploited to meet the most critical needs.
Size the General Staff to the needs
The rise in power of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) remains slow and modest. A European Union General Staff must now be sized, both in terms of personnel and functional premises, commensurate with the Union’s international responsibilities, without however aiming for a European “NATO shape”. It must, in particular, be able to assume the fullness of the functions of an Operational Staff: planning, plan of operation, command and control.
Use existing structures
This is particularly the case of the Eurocorps, the Franco-German Brigade, the EUROMARFOR Naval Force, the European Air Transport Command (EATC), or the European Union Satellite Centre (EU SatCen) in Torrejon:
- The Eurocorps should regain its initial objective of containing large units, armoured or mechanised divisions, in other words find again its original dimension as an operational army corps of 60,000 people, when it is now only a staff without troops. The decision-making power of its employment, which currently rests with the 6 participating countries (France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and since 2022, Poland) and which does not depend on the European Union bodies, should be transferred to the European Council.
- The Franco-German Brigade should be made available to the EU so that it can be engaged as such in EU operations.
- In the maritime field, EUROMARFOR brings together France, Italy, Spain and Portugal to set up a common
naval force. We could make this operational structure permanent and again transfer the decision to use this naval force at the EU level. - In the field of military air transport, the EATC is a particularly eloquent example of the effectiveness of pooling the air transport fleets of seven Member States (Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and Italy) and already constitutes a valuable defence tool available to the Union.
- It is the same with the Torrejon Satellite Center whose services are valuable to the EU both for geostrategic analysis and for EU operational commitments.
Conclusion
There is a lot to be done to optimise the current means of the EU in terms of defence. The implementation of the necessary measures in terms of personnel and equipment and an optimisation of the existing means are perfectly possible in the short term. It only depends on the political will to apply in practice what the European institutions allow in their current state. Some of these measures involve a more pronounced sharing of competences and we can well understand the reluctance of Member States to lose a little of their sovereignty. Nevertheless, Europeans expressed themselves clearly in the report of the Conference on the Future of Europe, so it is up to European and national decision-makers to fulfill their obligations vis-à-vis our future!
General ret. Jacques Favin Lévêque
is a member of EuroDéfense-France. After graduating from “Ecole Polytechnique”, he chose a career in arms and served during the cold war in the French forces in Germany and at the General Staff of the Army in Paris, then at the General Delegation for Armaments (DGA). He managed the “Groupement des Industriels de l’Armement Terrestre” (GIAT) from 1993 to 2003. Campaigning for a Europe capable of assuming its own defence, he launched a message of hope to young people in his latest book entitled Grand-père, c’est quoi l’Europe? (Grandfather, what’s Europe?)
