by Debalina Ghoshal, Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Council on International Policy (Canada), and India correspondent for this magazine, Kolkata
One of the key objectives of maritime powers in the Indo-Pacific region is to protect and secure their sea lines of communication (SLOCs). These include major maritime routes between ports used for trade, logistic support and naval power. Securing “choke points” so that maritime activities flow smoothly is a necessity for states like India that exert influence throughout the Indo-Pacific. As India also aims to become a big player in the ASEAN market and is a participant in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) together with Australia, Japan and the United States, it needs to exert a balanced maritime influence in the region.
India’s maritime interests
Since the Indo-Pacific region is crucially important for economic and strategic reasons, states like China have established military bases in the region, like the naval base in Djibouti. To enhance its maritime presence, India therefore needs to counter military-
driven challenges in order to further its economic interests, especially as its doctrine in the region is “Security And Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR)”. As its name suggests, SAGAR goes beyond defence and also encompasses “security, capacity building, collective action, sustainable development, maritime engagement and regional connectivity”.
While advancing cooperation remains a major regional objective for India through its “Act East Policy”, countering competition and conflicts in the region remains a challenge – a challenge that can only be met under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In managing both regional competition and creating scope for cooperation,
maritime supremacy is a necessity.
Strengthening blue water capability
A strong blue water capability would enable New Delhi to secure its SLOCs. An often overlooked aspect of this capability in the Indo-Pacific is the need for a robust air and missile defence system. While aircraft carriers strengthen states’ blue water capability and make them greater naval powers, they are always an important target for adversaries. Naval missile defence capability is therefore crucial to protect these key sea-based assets.
In April this year, India conducted successful flight testing of a sea-based interceptor that would provide it with a naval Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability that could intercept hostile missiles and airborne warning and control systems (AWACS). The Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) responsible for the development of this naval BMD capability is focussing on highly complex network-centric anti-ballistic missile systems. Dr Samir V. Kamat, Chairman of DRDO, assured that “the next generation of dedicated BMD vessels will be equipped with such systems with long range radars and sensors to detect, track and destroy hostile missiles.”
Regional complexities
India’s partners in the Indo-Pacific region like Australia and Japan already possess naval missile defence capability through their Aegis Ashore systems. India conducts maritime exercises with these states. These enable the development of greater deterrence vis-à-vis China, that possesses advanced long-range missile capabilities that could threaten India and its partners’ maritime influence in the region.
However, maritime deterrence will not only be strengthened through credible offensive assets but also by a robust “defence by denial” capability. Hence, while India is developing its indigenous BMD assets, it needs to ensure that they are interoperable with the naval BMD capabilities of its partners. This is all the more necessary as India must be able, with its partners, to counter China’s influence in the region and justify the tag it has earned of being a “balancer.” In focusing on naval BMD capability, India also needs to consider the threats emanating from cruise missiles. Hence, its future missile defence capability must also be able to counter cruise missiles as well as systems like multiple-independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) and complex hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs). The missile defence system must therefore encompass hypersonic threat interception capability, including glide phase interceptors (GPI) for intercepting hypersonic missiles and glide vehicles respectively.
Conclusion
India obviously has a keen interest in the Indo-Pacific region owing to its economic and strategic significance. However, strong maritime influence cannot be exerted in the region without a credible blue water capability, which means not just possessing it, but also being able to protect and defend it. India therefore needs to focus on maritime missile defence capabilities that could mitigate these challenges and enable New Delhi to become a major player in the Indo-Pacific region.
Debalina Ghoshal
is a Non-Resident Research Fellow with the Council on International Policy, Canada. She is also the India correspondent for “The European – Security and Defence Union” magazine. Her work focuses on issues such as nuclear, missiles, missile defence and artillery.
